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In the span of a mere decade, the explosion of the Internet into the American
consciousness has influenced virtually every aspect of our society. One such area
is the music industry and the enforcement of copyright. More specifically, the
rise and apparent demise of Napster represents, depending upon one's
ideological leanings, many of the best and worst implications of how the Internet
may function to transform a society straddling millennia. The author first
examines the history of Napster, the various stakeholders, and the legal issues
raised by the file-sharing service. However, this is only part of the story. The
more interesting question is to what extent Napster has become a catalyst for the
normative re-conceptualization of copyright in society. The author examines the
cultural and social forces unleashed and popularized by Napster. In light of
Napster-like substitutes, enforcement problems, and imperfect market solutions,
the author argues that the issues raised by Napster will be contested on a variety
offronts into the foreseeable future.
"Right now, things are messy," admits Napster creator Shawn Fanning
regarding the onslaught of lawsuits over Napster's operations, "[b]ut it's not as
bad a situation as many would think."' With this statement, Fanning manages to
encapsulate the current tempest surrounding Napster and other on-line services
utilizing peer-to-peer (PTP) file sharing technology.2 The emergence of the
Internet as a means of communicating and exchanging information threatens
copyright protection in a way unlike any previously encountered. The recent past
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Jenny Eliscu, Napster Fights Back, ROLLING STONE, June 22, 2000, at 29.
See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing PTP file-sharing technology).
3 Says Jupiter Communications analyst Aram Sinnreich, "[t]he hype is justified. Network
file sharing has profound implications for the business model of [all entertainment and content-
based industries]." Adam Cohen, A Crisis of Content, TIME, Oct. 2, 2000, at 68 (internal
quotation marks omitted). One such non-obvious example is the stitching-pattem industry. Id
Jim Hedgepath, president of Pegasus Originals, discovered that craft enthusiasts were
downloading his artists' copyrighted work for free off of a website. Id. The threat of litigation
caused the site to shut down, but within days the same bootlegs were available on an
underground, members-only site. Id. "Many artists have gone, and many more will go," says
Hedgepath. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "I've talked to a lot who are looking for
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has witnessed numerous lawsuits as the music industry, amongst others,
scrambles to protect the commercial value of their copyrights.4 But Fanning's
comment also betrays the hope of some that there is a light at the end of the
tunnel. While the record companies view Napster and its progeny as the new
menace on the horizon, others consider them a valuable tool not only to transform
a music industry ripe for overhaul but also to effect a fundamental change in how
copyrights are enforced on the Internet.
Part I of this note will focus on the background and technology of Napster:
what it does and how it works. Part II will detail how the battle lines have been
drawn, what the various interests of the different stakeholders are, and what
arguments are being made both for and against Napster's legality.
Part III will examine the application of the current law to Napster. This part
will specifically focus on various safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DCMA), the fair-use doctrine, and the substantial non-infringing
use doctrine, as espoused in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.5 Analysis
will show that, in accord with the decisions of the Northern District of California6
and the Ninth Circuit,7 Napster is engaging in copyright infringement within the
current meaning of the law. This part will also briefly examine the likely reach of
an anti-Napster precedent.
Part IV will explore my thesis that, regardless of the legal fate of Napster, the
forces unleashed by Napster as a social phenomenon still threaten the music
industry's enforcement of copyright on the Internet. First, I will examine three
philosophies underlying and propelling Napster's meteoric ascension to
popularity. Second, this part will discuss alternative PTP file sharing services and
the various barriers to enforcement they pose. Third, potential market-based
solutions to the enforcement problems will be discussed.
It is my contention that, due primarily to two core reasons-the
popularization of more progressive and radical philosophies catalyzed by Napster
and the enforcement issues posed by Napster-like substitutes-any market
solution will be an imperfect one. As a result of these factors, the foreseeable
future will witness an interaction of legal, philosophical, and economical forces as
the music industry attempts to maintain the commercial value of its copyrights on
the Internet. I propose that the ultimate resolution of these issues will depend
something else to do." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624,
625 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
5 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
6 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter
Napster I].
7 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster
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upon the extent to which Napster's rise in popularity is truly indicative of a
normative re-conceptualization of the proper role of copyright in music and
society at large.
I. HISTORY OF NAPSTER, MP3, AND PTP FILE-SHARING
Napster began as the brain child of then nineteen-year-old Shawn Fanning.8
The Napster program was originally a way for Fanning to trade music in the MP3
format with friends located throughout the country. Fanning and his friends were
having trouble finding files they wanted, and the idea was to create a way for
people to search for files and talk to each other.9 The program went up in
September 1999, and struck a resonant chord with music fans, as the number of
users began to double every five to six weeks. °
Napster facilitates the trading of individual songs in the MP3 format.' A
common misconception is that when someone downloads a song, the source of
that song is Napster itself. However, Napster in its most basic form is a searching
and indexing program. Users download a program called MusicShare from the
Napster website, which allows them to interact with Napster's server-side
software. When each individual user logs in to Napster with the use of a
password, the MusicShare software reads the names of MP3 files that the user has
made available to others. The Napster software then compiles, in real-time, a list
of all available songs from all users who are currently logged into the Napster
system.12 Napster next performs a search function whereby users enter a desired
8 Steven Levy, The Noisy War Over Napster, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, at 49. The name
Napster was a childhood nickname of Fanning's. Id. at 50. As a freshman at Northeastern
University in Boston, Fanning developed the Napster software in his dorm room in January,
1999. Rob Sheffield, The Most Dangerous Man in the Music Biz, ROLLING STONE, July 6-20,
2000, at 42.
9 Levy, supra note 8, at 50.
1° Id.
" MP3 technology was first created by the Motion Picture Experts Group in the early
1980s as the audio portion of the MPEG- I audiovisual format. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *2 n.I (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000)
[hereinafter Napster 11]. MP3 files reproduce nearly CD-quality sound in a compressed format.
Id. at *3. The technology essentially allows people to convert the information stored on a CD,
which is quite large and unwieldy, into a format which can be quickly and efficiently uploaded
and downloaded on the Intemet. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys.,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing MP3 technology).
Consumers can acquire MP3 files in two ways. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901. The first
is to download recordings that have already been converted into the MP3 format. Id. The
second is to utilize "ripping" software which copies an audio CD directly onto a computer hard
drive and converts the CD's music into MP3 format. Id.
2 In other words, at any given moment, exactly what songs are available is dependent
upon who is logged in and what songs they have available on their own computer.
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song title or artist, click on the "Find It" button, and view a list of files responsive
to the search request. To download a file, the user simply highlights it and clicks
the "Get Selected Songs" button.
1 3
This process is what is meant by peer-to-peer ("PTP") file-sharing. When a
user clicks on the name of a file to download it, the Napster server communicates
with the requesting and host users' MusicShare browser software to facilitate a
connection and initiate the file download. 14 In other words, Napster merely
connects two computers. The requesting user downloads the file directly from the
host user's computer-the file is not routed through the Napster server at all. 5
From its humble beginnings, Napster had attracted more new customers in
less time than any other online service in history.16 At the height of its popularity
in early February 2001, the service had 80 million registered users. 17 For
comparison, Yahoo's visitor roster at the time averaged only 54 million per
month. 8 By mid-year 2000, approximately 10,000 music files were shared per
second using Napster, and 100 users attempted to connect to the system every
second.' 9 As of early 2001, approximately 1.6 million users were online at any
one time.20 It is estimated that 2 billion songs were downloaded using Napster in
January 2001, up from 1.4 billion in September 2000, when the research firm
Webnoize began its measurements. 2' Now, Napster is a for-profit corporation
22
that plans to cash in on its wide-spread popularity. Napster, Inc.'s market value,
measured in part by the size of its user base, was between 60 and 80 million
dollars in mid-year 2000.23 Further, while it is extremely difficult to predict the
future of Napster 24-- or even how long it will be in existence-the company was
still alive in 2002 and had begun testing a new pay service.25
" Napster 111, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *3-*4.
14/d.
5 Morning Edition: Three-Judge Panel Hears Arguments from Both Sides in the Napster
Case (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000).
16 James Harding, Music Labels Go Back to School, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at
32.
17 Jefferson Graham, A Slimmed-Down Napster Gets Back Online; Trial Run is Heavy on
Little-Known Artists, USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2002, at D1.
18 Jefferson Graham, Napster Moving Toward Monthly Fee: Song-Swapping Service
CouldSet the Tonefor Internet Music Sales, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2001, at Al.
9 Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
20 German Media Firm Says Napster Will Charge Fees, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan.
31, 2001, atC7.
21 Graham, supra note 18, at Al.
2 Levy, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that the original idea to form Napster into a business
first came from Fanning's uncle).
23 Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
24 Napster went off-line in July of 2001, and as of January 2002, the five major record
labels were still suing Napster for copyright infringement. However, at this time, the new CEO
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II. STAKEHOLDERS AND SUMMARY OF THE NAPSTER DEBATE
One large contingent of people raising their voices against Napster 6 are the
artists and record labels themselves. A long list of artists have spoken out against
the service, including Don Henley, Garth Brooks, Art Alexakis of Everclear,
Elton John, and Puff Daddy.27 Metallica and Dr. Dre were the first recording
artists to actually take legal action.28 The concerns of recording artists involve the
loss not only of royalty payments29 but also of artistic control over their own
music. ° However, there has been a small group that have spoken up in support of
Napster.3' In addition, some artists have at least tried to utilize the new PTP file
sharing technology in promotions, often with little support from their record
labels.
32
of Napster, Konrad Hilbers, was still trying to both settle these cases and persuade the labels to
license their music to the new Napster. Graham, supra note 17, at D1.25 Napster announced, on January 9, 2002, that it had begun testing a new pay version of
its music-swapping service with 20,000 selected users. Company officials said they expected
the new service to be fully operational by April 2002, and that the price for the service would be
between five dollars and ten dollars. Napster Inc.: Music-Swapping Service Is Testing New Pay
Version, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2002, at B11.
26 As stated previously, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, the quickly
evolving nature of Napster makes it an extremely difficult topic to keep abreast of. In the
discussion that follows, therefore, any references to Napster are generally meant to apply to the
older, free version as opposed to the new, pay service unless indicated. Further, much of the
discussion which follows is also relevant to other file-sharing services-the so-called Napster
substitutes, see infra Part IV.B,-and should be deemed to apply where relevant.
27 Eliscu, supra note 1, at 29.2 In early April 2000, the rock group Metallica were the first recording artists to file suit
against Napster for copyright infiingement and racketeering, and they included as defendants
three universities where the Napster program was popular with students and infringing activities
occurred. Weekend Edition Sunday: Napster: Software Company Being Sued by Several Artists
and Record Companies for Copyright Infingement (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Metallica NPR Broadcast]. Dr. Dre filed his lawsuit on April 25, 2000. Eliscu,
supra note 1, at 29.
29 "What [Napster is] doing is straight-up bullshit, and I'm going to fight it to the death,"
says Dr. Dre. Eliscu, supra note 1, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Napster is taking
food out of my kids' mouths. I've always dreamed about making a living at something that I
love to do. And they're destroying my dream." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).30 Metallica drummer Lars Ulrich says the band has no problem with people recording and
trading live performances so long as nobody makes any profit. Metallica NPR Broadcast, supra
note 28. Their lawsuit was prompted because "[t]he bottom line is it's our music and our
masters [i.e., the final version of songs that appear on recorded albums], and we control those.
We have the right to make the decisions about who we make them available to." Id.
3 Says Public Enemy's Chuck D: "The only ones screaming about this are those who had
dominance in the prior system." Eliscu, supra note 1, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32In what would have been perhaps the most daring online music promotion ever, the
group Offspring planned to release their entire album, Conspiracy of One, for free in MP3
2002]
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Looking outside the music industry, a large and powerful coalition of
stakeholders have also rallied behind the record companies' suit against Napster.
These include the Motion Picture Association of America, publishers, media
photographers, graphic artists, digital software people, the Music Producers
Guild, and even the National Basketball Association and Major League
Baseball.33 All of these groups signed an anti-Napster brief, their interest being to
ensure that copyright laws carry over from the physical world to the Internet.34
Allied with these groups is the Business Software Alliance (BSA), a trade group
representing such software manufactures as Microsoft and Adobe, which
submitted its own brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Napster
litigation. BSA's concern is that the negative publicity being generated by
Napster may overshadow the legitimate uses of PIT file-sharing technology,
around which many BSA members are hoping to build business.3"
By contrast, however, there also exist many groups aligned in favor of
Napster. One group includes companies that make computer hardware,
telecommunications equipment, and consumer electronics (in other words, those
that stand to make money derivatively from the increased and continued
popularity of PTP file-sharing).36 These companies make the same argument as a
group of law professors who filed a pro-Napster brief in the Ninth Circuit
litigation: that copyright law should not be used to ban new technologies that have
legitimate purposes.3 7 Another pro-Napster ally is the conservative activist group
the Eagle Forum. It fears that an injunction against Napster could set a precedent
that would allow companies to control or prevent the dissemination of
information about their products.38
format several weeks before its release in record stores. Jenny Eliscu, The Offspring Go Offline,
ROLLING STONE, Nov. 9, 2000, at 33. After Sony Music, parent company of the band's
Columbia Records recording label, and the band threatened each other with lawsuits, Offspring
agreed to release only a single, "Original Prankster," as a free MP3 file on more than 200
websites. Id. The Offspring's gambit would have been a direct challenge to the music industry's
position that the availability of free MP3s will hurt record sales. Similarly "[i]n March 1999,
Tom Petty removed a free download of his single 'Free Girl Now' from MP3.com after only
two days when his label, Warner Brothers, expressed concerns." Id. at 34.33 Morning Edition: Napster Case Draws Support from Both Sides of Copyright Issue
(NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Napster Draws Support].
34 d. ("[All these groups will] suffer irreparable harm," says Jack Valenti, president of the
Motion Picture Association of America, "if the court allows users of Napster-like systems to
freely copy books, photographs and broadcasts of ball games.").3 5 id.
36 id.
7 Id. This is similar to the argument that the current Napster suit parallels the suit brought
by the movie industry against Sony in the early 1980s over the introduction of Sony's Betamax
VCR. See infra Part III.B.
38 Napster Draws Support, supra note 33. Phyllis Schlafly, president of the Eagle Forum,
gives the example of Novartis Pharmaceuticals, the company that owns the trademark, and
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Another group reiterating the concerns expressed by the Eagle Forum is the
Digital Media Association, or DiMA, a trade group representing Internet
companies that provide audio and video content. While neither pro- nor anti-
Napster, DiMA believes the decision by Judge Patel, granting the temporary
injunction against Napster,39 erroneously puts the burden onNapster to prevent its
users from infringing copyright use. Jonathan Potter, President of DiMA
perceives this decision as sweeping away the protection of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), a federal law designed to protect Internet service
providers from liability.
40
The legal position of the music industry boils down to the simple contention
that Napster facilitates stealing. Bringing together people who exchange almost
CD-quality music for free means lower sales for all artists, which translates into
less revenue for record companies and threatens the livelihood of the artists
themselves.41 Napster counters this contention with the argument that it exposes
listeners to new music, in a sense being akin to a new kind of radio that actually
promotes music sales.42 Further, Napster contends that its users are engaging in
the noncommercial trading of music files for personal use.43 Therefore, as the
copyrights on much of the information about, the drug Ritalin. Id. Her concern is that the
company, by virtue of their copyrights, could shut down all search engines that lead people to
criticisms of Ritalin and alternate remedies. Id.39 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
40 Napster Draws Support, supra note 33.
The provider of the service doesn't know everything the service is being used for. We
know what the service is being marketed for, we know how we're advertising it, but we
don't know how every consumer is using it, and we don't want to have a responsibility for
policing our consumers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part HI.A (discussing the DMCA).
4' Fred Goodman, The Future is Now: How the Internet Is Reshaping the Record Industry,
ROLLING STONE, July 6-20, 2000, at 41.421 Id. Says John Perry Barlow-former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, co-founder and vice-
chairman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and associate professor at Harvard Law
School's Berkman Center for Internet and Society: "If people are selling songs that are my
work and collecting the proceeds, I think that's theft.... If people are distributing my work, as
they are on Napster, I don't regard that as theft, I regard it as advertising." Id. at 45 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Adds Don Rose, the founder and president of Rykodisc:
Remember when the RIAA went after home taping in the Seventies? ... They had a
sticker... and a slogan [that read] HOME TAPING IS KILLING Music. Well, it didn't. And
remember how videotapes were going to kill film? Before that, records were going to kill
live performances. In each case the opposite turned out to be true. You've got to take a
historic perspective. Napster is a new technology, and it's freaking out the status quo.
Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 It is not seriously alleged that Napster users receive monetary compensation in exchange
for making MP3 files available to others for downloading. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
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individual users themselves are not engaging in copyright infringement, Napster
argues it cannot be "secondarily liable for users' nonactionable exchange of
copyrighted musical recordings.
' 44
As might be said, though, the proof is in the pudding. Napster proponents cite
several statistics, studies, and examples of its benign impact on record sales.45
While this might be the case, the more compelling studies (and common sense)
belie the fact that, in the end, access to free music will ultimately hurt record
sales.46 Whereas before consumers had the simple choice of buying or not buying
music, now they have the option of not buying and still owning the music.
Furthermore, the proliferation of portable MP3 players and CD burners allow
people to take the music they downloaded at no cost and use it as freely as if they
44 Napster I 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
41 For example, three of the most popular artists in terms of trading on Napster-Eminem,
'N Sync, and Britney Spears-sold record-setting numbers in 2000. Goodman, supra note 41,
at 42. Record sales for the first quarter of 2000 were also up nearly 8% over the year before.
Metallica NPR Broadcast, supra note 28. In addition, a study of college students who download
music, conducted by the Internet research firm Webnoize, Inc., found that the majority of
students do not permanently store the files they download. Eliscu, supra note 1, at 29. This
sentiment is echoed by a Rolling Stone poll of some 5,000 readers, which states that only 8%
believed that free music on the Interet decreased the number of CDs they purchased, while
36% felt it increased purchases. RS Readers Poll: Music and the Internet, ROLLING STONE, July
6-20, 2000, at 45 [hereinafter Readers Poll].
46 Says one fourteen-year-old in Falls Church, Virginia: "I haven't purchased a CD in quite
some time." Levy, supra note 8, at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, Forrester
Research conducted a study that in the next five years the music industry will lose $3.1 billion
to Internet piracy and the increasing independence of musicians. Cohen, supra note 3, at 70.
Some of the most telling studies are those focusing on college students, Napster's biggest
users. Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 909. One such study, prepared by plaintiffs' expert witness
in the case against Napster, Dr. E. Deborah Jay, shows that 41% of college students surveyed
"described [Napster's] impact on their music purchases in a way which either explicitly
indicated or suggested that Napster displaces CD sales." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Jay's overall conclusion was that the more music Napster users downloaded, the more likely
they were to admit that such habits reduced their music purchases. Id. Another study, prepared
by Soundscan, compared sales from retail stores near university campuses to nationwide
averages. The conclusion is that "on-line file sharing has resulted in a loss of album sales within
college markets." Id. at 909-10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The data suggests that sales
in these markets were off 2.5% during the same period that overall records sales were up.
Goodman, supra note 41, at 42.
In addition, statistics released for the year 2000 present even more damning evidence. The
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry reported that worldwide music sales fell
for the first time since it began collecting data some ten years ago. Worldwide sales declined
1.3% to $36.9 billion and unit sales dropped by 1.2% to $3.5 billion. Also, in the United States,
the sale of CD singles, perhaps "the market most likely to be hit by the Internet," fell by 39%.
David Teather, Once Bitten, Twice Shy: Napster Has Been Tamed, but the Wider Battle for
Online Music Is Only Just Beginning, THE GuARDIAN (London), May 14,2001, at 62.
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had purchased it legitimately.47 What further bothers Napster critics is the
impression among many, especially younger users, that downloading music from
Napster is not morally wrong.48 Many perceive Napster as fulfilling a sort of
modem-day Robin Hood role: taking from the unscrupulous, rich recording
companies and giving back to the general public after years of paying exorbitant
prices for CDs.49
IIH. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF NAPSTER
This Part analyzes the current law as it applies to the Napster litigation. As
per the decisions of the Northern District of California ° and Ninth Circuit5' in
granting and upholding a preliminary injunction against Napster, respectively,
current law points to the finding that Napster engaged in copyright violation. The
following discussion first examines the inapplicability of the DMCA, the fair-use
doctrine, the substantial non-infringing use doctrine, and the Sony case as
potential shields to liability. Finally, the likely reach of a Napster legal precedent
will be examined.
A. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) are one possible argument for the legality of Napster.52 Passed in 1998,
the DMCA53 addresses the liability of online service and Internet access providers
for copyright infringements occurring online. Subsection 512(a) of the DMCA
41 The record industry's concern about the availability of portable MP3 players
contributing to the appeal of MP3 file piracy led to the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) filing suit against Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., makers of the Rio, a
portable MP3 player, in October 1998. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 624, 625 (C.D. Cal. 1998). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit denied the
RIAA's request for an injunction and, citing the Sony case, suggested that the Rio player
constituted fair use. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180
F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or
'space shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive.").
48 "Basically they're saying our art is worthless, it's free for the taking," says Ron Stone,
manager for such artists as Tracy Chapman and Bonnie Raitt. "Music used to be a collectible,
now it's a disposable." Levy, supra note 8, at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49 The Rolling Stone poll indicates that only 25% of respondents felt it was wrong to
download an artist's music for free. Readers Poll, supra note 45, at 45. A typical response from
one Virginia teenager is that "[p]eople don't think it's anything bad. Or think about it at all."
Levy, supra note 8, at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).5 0 Napsterl, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
" Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
52 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Supp. V 1999).
53 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
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exempts qualifying "service providers"54 from monetary liability for direct,
vicarious, and contributory infringement and limits injunctive relief.5" Subsection
512(a) limits liability "for infiingement of copyright by reason of the [service]
provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a
system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider" if five
conditions are met.16 Napster's claim, therefore, is that § 512(a) protects its core
function of "transmitting, routing, and providing connections for sharing of the
files its users choose.
5 7
This argument falls down for several reasons. First, Napster does not
transmit, route, or provide connections "through a system or network controlled"
by the service provider as expressly required by § 512(a).5" Legislative history
indicates that § 512(a) was meant to apply only to activities "in which a service
provider plays the role of a 'conduit' for the communications of others."59 It is
true that the Napster server enables or facilitates the connection between the host
and requesting user by conveying the information necessary to establish such a
connection. However, the connection itself occurs through the Intemet. As
54 The DMCA defines "service provider" as:
As used in subsection (a), the term "service provider" means an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(l)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 512(a).6 /d. The five conditions outlined in § 512(a) are:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by the direction of someone other
than the service provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out
through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service
provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an
automatic response to the request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is
maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated
recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or
provision of connections; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of
its content.
Id.
57 Napster III, No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May
5, 2000).
58 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (emphasis added).
59 H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11), at 51 (1998).
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previously discussed, Napster has no part in the exchange of files between users;
this occurs directly between the host and requesting users through the Internet
itself.60 It cannot be maintained that Napster owns or controls the Internet itself.
What makes more sense is that § 512(a) was intended to protect an entirely
different kind of service provider than that contemplated by Napster. Even
assuming that browser software on each user's computer is part of the Napster
system, transmission of files occurs between different parts of the system, not
"through" the system.6' This situation is more akin to an intranet system, like
those developed by companies to share information among different branches or
offices. The term "through" denotes protection for systems operated by such
classic Internet service providers as AOL or CompuServe. These service
providers, much more clearly, perform a gate-keeping or access-providing
function. Here, the service providers truly are passive conduits whereby
information is transmitted through their system, solely at the request of users and
without any modification of content, to the end user's computer. It is the
connection through these service providers to the Internet itself that makes the
transmission of information possible.
The second argument against Napster is that, regardless of meeting the
requirements of § 512(a), the relevant aspects of Napster should not be analyzed
under that section. It is true that Napster partially entails automatically
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for its users.62 However, Napster
primarily functions as an information-gathering tool. 63 Furthermore, these
searching and indexing functions, economically speaking, are its core value. From
a user's perspective, it is not the ability to transmit MP3 files, but the ability to
quickly and conveniently find MP3 files one wants to download that makes
Napster an appealing service. 64 In fact, Napster has advertised how users can
easily locate "millions of songs" without "wading through page after page of
unknown artists."6' Therefore, if Napster were to enjoy any of the safe-harbor
provisions, it would have to meet the more stringent eligibility requirements of
§ 512(d), which it does not.66
60 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.6'Napster III, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *21-*22.61Id. at *15.
63 Edward Kessler, Napster's vice president of engineering, stated in his deposition that
"Napster operates exactly like a search engine or information location tool to the user." Id. at
* 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 As discussed previously, part of the impetus for Shawn Fanning's development of
Napster was exactly this problem. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
61 Napster II, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at * 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66 Section 512(d) states it protects service providers from liability "for infringement of
copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing
infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a
directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link .... 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (Supp. V 1999)
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Finally, an argument which cuts against the application of any DMCA safe
harbor provision is § 512(i). This subsection imposes additional copyright
compliance requirements on eligibility for any DMCA safe harbor, namely
notifying users that chronic infringing use may result in the termination of user
privileges.67
What is abundantly clear is that Napster, besides not following this section,68
had actual incentive to see the continuation of infringing copyright use.
Section 512(i) requires that a service provider must have, "reasonably
implemented.., a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers." 69 Because Napster does not collect personal
information from users, those who are kicked off the service can resubscribe.7° In
fact, a document authored by Sean Parker, co-creator of Napster, stresses the need
for Napster to remain ignorant of users' real names and IP addresses "since they
are exchanging pirated music. '71 Another option which Napster ignored was
blocking the IP addresses of those already kicked off the service. While Napster
claimed this is not a reasonable means of terminating use, the company actually
utilized this very method in some situations.72
(emphasis added). This protection, however, is contingent upon the fact that the service
provider does not possess actual knowledge, or is unaware of facts that would make it apparent,
that infringing activity is taking place. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A), (B). Subsection (C) requires
the service provider to "expeditiously ... remove, or disable access to, the material" upon
obtaining knowledge of the infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(l)(C). As the discussion
accompanying infra notes 68-75 demonstrates, Napster officials not only had knowledge of
infringing use but also were promoting and facilitating this infringing activity.
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(l)(A). While legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend
to require service providers to "investigate possible infringements, monitor its service or make
difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not infringing," the notice requirement is
designed to insure that repeat offenders "know that there is a realistic threat of losing [their]
access." H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11), at 61 (1998).
68 Napster did not adopt a written copyright policy that was communicated to users until
February 2000, two months after the filing of the initial suit by record companies against
Napster. Napster III, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *26. Although § 512(i) does not specify
when the copyright compliance policy must be in place, it is counter-intuitive to assume that
Congress meant to allow otherwise guilty actors to diffuse liability by the post-hoc addition of
such a policy.
69 17 U.S.C. § 512(iXl)(A).
70 As in the Metallica litigation, Napster subsequently blocked the access of users based on
their user-name and password. However, as one University of Maryland sophomore says,
"Anyone who wants to get back on right now can easily do it." Eliscu, supra note 1, at 29
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
7 2 Napster bans the IP addresses of users who run "bots," programs that continuously
perform actions in a robotic fashion, on the service. Napster III, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at
*29 & n.8.
[Vol. 63:799
NAPSTER OPENS PANDORA'S BOX
Furthermore, other activities clearly reveal that, from a very early point,
Napster executives possessed knowledge of, and were in fact encouraging, the
infringing activity of its users. At one point, Napster executives downloaded
infringing material to their own computers and took photographs of the screen
listing infringing files as promotion for the site.73 Also, an early version of the
Napster website proudly proclaimed the ease with which users could find their
favorite music without "wading through page after page of unknown artists."74
Napster also recognized its own vested interest in the promotion and continuation
of copyright infringement by its users. As Sean Parker stated in a litigation
deposition: "[W]e are not just making pirated music available but also pushing
demand."75
B. Fair-Use, Substantial Non-Infringing Use, and the Sony76 Case
Many in the pro-Napster camp parallel the current situation with the
introduction of the VCR in the mid 1980s. While the Sony case, on its surface,
may appear to lend support to the fair-use and substantial non-infringing use
arguments, ultimately the cases are dissimilar, and these defenses should not be
applicable to Napster.
The Supreme Court in Sony stated: "Any individual may reproduce a
copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner does not possess the
exclusive right to such a use. '77 Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a non-
exhaustive list of fair-use factors: 78
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit education purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or the value of the
copyrighted work.
73NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
74 Napster III, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *18.
" Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra notes
123-24 and accompanying text.
76 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
77 Id. at 433.
78 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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Looking at the first factor, if the new work transforms the copyrighted
material in any way, this can satisfy fair use. 79 However, converting sound
recordings from the CD to the MP3 format does not transform or add any new
value to the original copyrighted work. °
Another issue in the "purpose and character" of the use is whether the use is
commercial or non-commercial.8 ' This is a crucial point where Napster's
argument is suspect. It is true that most, if not all, Napster users downloaded
songs for their own enjoyment, not to sell for profit. It would appear this is no
different, therefore, than the situation of where one friend makes a copy of a song
on tape or a copy of a movie on HBO. This analogy, though, fails for several
reasons. First, the nature of the interaction between users is different. The
majority of music-swapping on Napster and similar services occurs not between
friends or acquaintances, but among anonymous users.82 Second, the technology
of the Internet largely removes the barriers of geography, time and effort, and
accessibility and allows for the copying of copyrighted material on a scale
previously incomprehensible.8 3 Third, courts have imputed commercial use, even
in the absence of direct economic benefit, from the "repeated and exploitative"
copying of "copyrighted works... to save the expense of purchasing authorized
copies.
' 84
Fourth, and most importantly, by being the facilitator in the transfer of files,
Napster really does change the nature of the transaction to a commercial one.
Napster is a for-profit corporation, and it has taken steps to monetize its
popularity with users.85 The business plan of Napster entails making money off of
other individuals' copyrighted material, which certainly entails commercial
79 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). Such is the fair-use
defense of a satirist. One example would be when the comedy show Saturday Night Live uses a
portion of a song in order to parody a musical artist.
80 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating such repackaging "adds no ... 'new aesthetics, new insights and understandings' to the
original") (citations omitted).
81 If a use is non-commercial, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing a "meaningful
likelihood" that it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted material.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. Likewise, although not conclusive, a commercial use weighs against a
finding of fair use. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
:3Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,912 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
Previously, someone wishing a copy of a song had to find someone with that song, and,
realistically, this person could not be in another city or state. As previously discussed, though,
part of Napster's appeal is that it allows people to search for exactly the songs they want and
provides an almost instantaneous connection to that source. See supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text.
84 Napster 11, 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA,
857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("finding commercial use when individuals
downloaded copies of video games 'to avoid having to buy video game cartridges"')).
85 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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activity.86 In many ways, Napster is very similar to the factual situation in
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.8" In Fonovisa, the defendants operated a
swap meet at which independent vendors sold counterfeit music recordings.
Although Napster users offer their music for free, like in Fonovisa, it would be
"difficult for the infringing activity to take place in the massive quantities alleged
without the support services provided. ..."" Also, Napster, like the defendants in
Fonovisa, stand to make a profit from facilitating this infringing use.
In addition, Napster rates poorly in an analysis of the second, third, and fourth
fair-use factors. With regards to the second factor, since'the MP3 files being
traded are creative in nature, they constitute entertainment, which cuts against a
finding of fair use.8 9 Under the third factor, transferring MP3 files over Napster
constitutes copying the entirety of the copyrighted work. Also, analysis of the
fourth factor shows Napster does not fall within fair use. Although the empirical
data is not currently overwhelming, that which is most persuasive suggests that
Napster use has had a negative effect on music purchasers. 90 Furthermore,
Napster directly interferes with record companies' attempts to enter the digital
downloading market.9' When faced with a choice of going to Napster and
downloading songs for free or having to pay for almost exactly the same product,
most will choose to get something for nothing.92
86 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that unauthorized copying of scholarly articles by for-profit enterprise constituted commercial
use as the enterprise reaped indirect economic advantage from copying).
87 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
88 Id. The support services provided by Napster include browser software, searching and
indexing functions, and a means of connecting users. Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
89 Works that are creative in nature or considered entertainment are "closer to the core of
intended copyright protection..." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; see also Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839
F. Supp. 1552, 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904
F.2d 152, 157-58 (2d Cir. 1990)).
90 See supra note 46. Furthermore, courts reject the suggestion that a positive impact on
sales negates the copyright holder's entitlement to access derivative markets. See Ringgold v.
Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 n.16 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that plaintiff retained
right to a licensing fee, even if infringing use of plaintiff's poster in television program
allegedly increased poster sales); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that allegedly positive impact on plaintiff's prior market "in no
way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly derives from reproduction
of... copyrighted works").
91 See Fred Goodman, Online but Not on Time, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 14, 2000, at 45, 50
(discussing the efforts of record labels to provide a Napster-type service and the problems they
are facing).
92 As a point of illustration, during the course of the Napster litigation, all forty-nine songs
available for purchase on Sony's website were available free of charge on Napster. Napster I,
114 F. Supp. 2d at 915; see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the
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Another possible legal defense for Napster is the staple article of commerce
doctrine, or substantial non-infringing use. The Supreme Court in Sony stated that
the defendant was not liable for selling VCRs because these items were "capable
of commercially significant non-infringing uses."93 The non-infringing use
identified in Sony was that of time-shifting, the ability of people to record a
television program in order to view it at a later time.94 Napster appealed to the fact
that it also provides several non-infringing services, including chat rooms, a "New
Artist Program" (which profiles and allows the downloading of music of
unsigned artists), sampling (the ability of Napster users to listen to a song before
they purchase it), and "space-shiffing" (the ability of a user to convert a CD he or
she already owns into MP3 format and use Napster to transfer music to a different
computer).95
However, the Napster situation is dis-analogous from Sony for several
reasons. First, the Court in Sony determined that time-shiffing represented the
principal use of "VTRs. '96 Furthermore, time-shifting was found not to have an
adverse impact on the television market. This is because, in the case of time-
shifting, people were recording television programs, which they were legally
entitled to watch in the first place.97 The primary use of Napster, however, is to
download copyrighted music. 98 This is born out not only by common sense but
attitude of many Napster users, who possess a sense of entitlement to free downloaded songs
and see nothing morally wrong with the practice).
93 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
' Id. at 423.95 NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 904, 907-08.
9' Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
97 Id. at 454-55.98 A sampling of files available on Napster showed that 87% were copyrighted. Napster I,
114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03. The New Artist Program is also seriously suspect. A sampling of
1,150 music files showed that only eleven were those of new artists. Id. at 904. Furthermore, the
New Artists program only began after the onslaught of litigation:
The evidence shows that, in fact, promoting [new artists] was not the chief strategy in
Napster's business plan. Rather, defendant promoted the availability of songs by major
stars.... Suddenly they found those unknown artists and would seek to use them as a basis
for protection against infringement of the well-known artist whose music they were
making available or providing access to.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1009483 at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2000)
(transcript of proceedings).
Napster's space-shifting argument has some support. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.
v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the space-
shifting function of [the portable MP3 player] Rio "paradigmatic noncommercial use").
However, the Ninth Circuit found Diamond dissimilar because, in that case, the method of
shifting did not also simultaneously involve making the copyrighted material available to the
countless other individuals. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding space-
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also by Napster's own internal documents and marketing strategy.99 "Indeed, the
most credible explanation for the exponential growth of traffic to the [Napster]
website is the vast array of free MP3 files offered by other users ....
C. The Limited Legal Precedent of Napster
Part H examined the interests of various factions who have a stake in the legal
fate of Napster. 10 1 Two of the main concerns espoused by these outlying
stakeholders are: (1) that the fall-out surrounding Napster may threaten other,
legitimate uses of PTP file-sharing technology;' °2 and (2) that the Napster case
may create a dangerous precedent, thereby placing an undue burden on Internet
service providers °3 and allowing companies to prevent the dissemination of
potentially critical information about their products over the Internet.
0 4
While a considerable amount of commentary is quick to discuss the
revolutionary ramifications of the Napster legislation, this appears to be one area
where Napster will have a limited impact. First, the legal fate of Napster will not
seriously undermine legitimate uses of PTP file-sharing or the Internet in general.
While evading copyright laws is one obvious use of peer-to-peer processing, there
are many other legitimate uses, and it does not appear that PTP technology will
shiffing of MP3 through a file-sharing service not fair use "even when previous ownership is
demonstrated before a download is allowed")).
In addition, the district court rejected Napster's sampling argument. Here, the court relied
primarily on the same factors it used in determining that Napster constitutes commercial use:
the ability to enjoy the benefit of a song file without paying for it and the ability to distribute
songs to countless number of users. Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913. By contrast, the Supreme
Court in Sony stated "time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see... a work which he had
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge ..." Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. In addition,
Napster users are able to keep a permanent copy of the songs they download, unlike other free
promotion downloads currently provided by record companies-which consist of thirty- to
sixty-second samples or full songs that are programmed to time out, or erase themselves, from
the user's computer. Napster , 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14. Finally, as previously discussed,
even if sampling did manage to positively impact records sales, Napster would still interfere
with the right of record companies to license their copyrighted material and enter the market for
downloadable music. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
:oo NapsterI, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
10' See supra Part H.
'
0 2 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns raised by the
DiMA).
04 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns and hypothetical
examples of the Eagle Forum).
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disappear if Napster goes the way of the dodo.' s Another indicator that a
potential demise of Napster will not sound the death knell for manufacturers of
consumer electronics is the Ninth Circuit's decision, in Recording Industry Ass 'n
of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 106 finding that production of
the Rio, a portable MP3 player, constituted substantial non-infringing use. °7
Further, the Napster litigation will not result in a crippling precedent that
either puts an onerous burden on companies or inhibits the free flow of ideas. The
DMCA and the fair-use doctrine still exist to protect many on-line activities. Part
ll.A. goes to great lengths to demonstrate how Napster was unique in its
affirmative strategy of trying to build a business based solely upon other people's
copyrighted works.'0 8 People going on-line to criticize the drug Ritalin are not in
jeopardy of being charged with copyright violations. 09 Similarly, services such as
Yahoo! or Google are not threatened because, unlike Napster, their financial
livelihood is not dependent upon the continuation and promotion of copyright
infringement." 0
Perhaps the most legitimate claim of these doomsayers is that the initial
injunction granted by the district court against Napster was much too broad. In
granting the injunction, "the district court... concluded that the law does not
require knowledge of 'specific acts of infringement' and rejected Napster's
contention that because the company cannot distinguish infringing fiom
noninfiinging files, it does not 'know' of the direct infringement.""' In other
words, because of the large amount of infringing activity occurring on Napster," 2
1o At its most basic, PTP computing allows multiple PCs to harness their joint processing
power for a common purpose. One current use of sharing processing power is assisting in the
SETI, or Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence Project. Here, people download the software,
along with data, onto their home computer, and their PCs help in the processing of information
that is being used to discover signs of intelligent life in the universe. Morning Edition:
Columnist Dan Gillmor of the San Jose Mercury News Discusses the Increase in Peer
Computing, Where Individual Computers Work Together to Help Process Information (NPR
radio broadcast, Sept. 27, 2000) (examining the myriad, legitimate uses for PTP computing not
threatened by the Napster litigation).
106 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
107 Id. at 1079 ("he Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or 'space shift,'
those files that already reside on a user's hard drive.").
'0' See supra notes 68-75 (discussing how Napster officials not only possessed positive
knowledge that its users were exchanging pirated music but were also encouraging such
1 7 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (allowing the fair-use defense for "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.., scholarship, or research").
"0 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11), at 58 (1998) (citing Yahoo! as an example of an
information location tool covered by 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)).
. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting and citing Napster I, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).112 See supra note 98.
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the district court imputed knowledge of all infringing activity, placing the burden
on Napster to monitor its users in order to avoid liability. The Ninth Circuit,
however, rejected this position: "We are bound to follow Sony, and will not
impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer
file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."" 13 In
remanding the case,114 the Ninth Circuit gave instructions for the district court to
limit the scope of its injunction to instances where Napster possessed specific
information relating to infringing activity." 5
IV. PROBLEMS STILL ON THE HORIZON
Part III analyzed the current legal landscape surrounding the Napster
litigation. However, this is only the beginning of the story. Part IV explores my
central thesis that, regardless of its legal fate, the cultural and philosophical forces
unleashed by Napster, combined with the technology of the Internet, are poised to
transform the music industry." 6 In many respects, Napster is a verifiable social
phenomenon. Says Pamela Samuelson, co-director of the Berkeley Center for
Law and Technology, "Despite all their scary characteristics, people love this
stuff."' 7 This sentiment is also being echoed by those inside the music industry:
"[To a certain extent, Napster] has been great for music. When was the last time
"
3 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417,436 (1984)).114/d. at 1029.
"5 The court stated in its opinion:
[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer
system operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material. To enjoin simply
because a computer network allows for infringing use would, in our opinion, violate Sony
and potentially restrict activity unrelated to the infringing use.
Id. at 1021 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
116 While most media attention has focused on Napster and the music industry, many other
content-based industries face a similar threat. Many of the barriers to large-scale internet trading
of such items as movies or books is due largely to technology limitations, barriers which very
soon may disappear. Cohen, supra note 3, at 68. For example, movies contain too much data
and simply take a long time to download currently. Books encounter the problem of being
much too cumbersome to read off of a computer screen. However, pirated content appears to be
a growing trend. A recent study cited by the Motion Picture Association of America estimates
that 275,000 pirated movies are downloaded a day on the Internet, and this number is expected
to increase to one million by 2002. Jefferson Graham, Next Napsters Wait in the Wings, USA
TODAY, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3D.
117 Levy, supra note 8, at 45; see also Goodman, supra note 91, at 45 ("he consumers are
telling us they want good service and easy access," says Jimmy lovine, co-chairman of
Interscope Records.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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people were talking this much about music? There aren't going to be any winners
until record companies reorient themselves to digital media."' 8
With this context in mind, section A details three distinct philosophies
underlying and propelling Napster's incredible popularity. Section B investigates
the various obstacles to enforcement in light of the availability other Napster-like
services. Section C examines a potential market solution to these dilemmas and
its likely inefficacy. Finally, section D predicts that, in light of these problems, the
foreseeable future will witness increased legal action and alternative proactive
measures as artists and record companies scramble to protect the commercial
value of their copyrights.
A. Three Different Philosophies
The theme coming from the Napster camp is that Napster is not about
stealing music, it is about a love of music. "What we want is to give new artists a
chance to be heard," says Fanning. "It's a celebration of artists."" 9 Talking about
his desire to meet Dave Matthews, front-man of the Dave Matthews Band, he
adds, "If I could just talk to Dave, one on one, as music lovers, ... I know he'd
understand what we're all about.'
120
And this sentiment is true, to a certain extent. What is more correct is to say
that Napster is about the death, or at least the transformation, of record companies
and the music industry as it exists today. The real question is what people hope to
gain, or lose, from any sort of change in the status quo.
In part, one aspect of the Napster debate really is about the music. The
complaint of many is that record companies and the drive for profits is killing
popular music as a true artistic and creative enterprise. The argument is not a new
one: radio and other outlets such as MTV have little interest in giving exposure to
artists outside the mainstream.' 2' Record companies push the music they think
they can market the easiest and to the most people.'2 2 This leads to music based
IIs Goodman, supra note 9 1, at 45 (reflecting the comments of Steve Gottlieb, president of
TVT Records) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119 Sheffield, supra note 8, at 45.
120 Id.
121 Says Geoff Mayfield, director of charts for Billboard magazine, "For the last decade,
radio has embraced songs rather than artists .... There just aren't any guarantees." Fred
Goodman, Sales Up, Biz Flat in 2000, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 15, 2001, at 21, 22 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122 Mayfield also cites several statistics that show record companies are increasingly
relying on blockbuster albums rather than overall market expansion. First, the year 2000 saw
the highest sales numbers for number one albums (albums that reach the top position on the
Billboard charts) since 1991. Id. Second, there were fewer artists selling 100,000 copies this
year than last. Thus, while album sales were up 4% from 1999, sales were unusually
concentrated in select titles as fewer artists found a significant following for their music. As
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upon the lowest common denominator. If people look to the 1930s and 1940s and
the era ofjazz as a high-water mark in American culture where the popular music
of the day was also an extremely vital, artistic movement, then the current era is a
cesspool of pre-packaged music meant to appeal mostly to twelve- to eighteen-
year-olds. Control of the market place, therefore, is driven not by true music
aficionados, but by corporate entities.'23
Napster and the Internet break wide apart this current paradigm. By giving
people easy access to a wide range of artists and music styles, the Internet has the
ability to loosen the stranglehold that marketing executives have on mainstream
American music. 24 The thrust of this contingent is not necessarily that music
should be free, 25 but that the manner in which music is produced, marketed, and
distributed in our society needs to change. As such, Napster is a positive force in
that it appears to be shaking up the music industry.
On another level, Napster is not about the music at all, it is about making a
profit. Whatever may have been the idealistic goals of Fanning when he first
created Napster, it is now big business. Napster is very much a part of the dot-
corn economy. In May 2000, even after the onslaught of legislation, the venture-
capital firm Hummer Winbald purchased a 20% ownership interest in the
company for $13 million, and other investors simultaneously invested $1.5
million. 2 6 Furthermore, early Napster documents show that its ultimate goal was
such, a troubling trend may be emerging whereby labels are "taking fewer chances on artists
who don't make an immediate commercial impact." Id.
123 In an interview with Rolling Stone magazine, pop-star Shaggy, whose album, Hotshot,
spent four weeks on the Billboard pop charts in early 2001, discusses how he was released from
his previous record label, Virgin, and his impression that record labels treat musicians like
commodities: "[lt's like chewing gum: You chew it, and when the juices run out, you spit it
out." Mim Udovitch, Q&A: Shaggy, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 15, 2001, at 31. In addition, Shaggy
responds to the question of whether the mentality of popular music has changed in the 1990s,
resulting in record labels not being interested in the long-term careers of their artists:
Absolutely, because [the record companies are] so corporate these days. It's not like
back in the day with Bob Marley, where you had Chris Blackwell, who owned his own
company, Island, and believed the hell in his artists, even if it took them seven albums.
Nowadays, if you ain't hitting on the first [album you release], God help you.
Id.
124 "Here's my mission," says John Perry Barlow, former lyricist for the Grateful Dead,
co-founder and vice-chairman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and associate professor at
Harvard Law School's Berkman Center for Internet and Society, "I want to destroy the music
industry so we can create the musician-and-audience industry." Goodman, supra note 41, at 45
(internal quotation marks omitted).
'25 "Let me be fair," says Barlow. "I think musicians and creative people have some
concerns here that we need to evolve the right economy to address. But taking laws that were
created for an entirely different economy and environment, and shoehoming cyberspace into
them is doomed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126 Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
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to "bypass the record industry entirely" and "bring about the death of the CD."'27
Call it blackmail or call it shrewd business practice, what is clear is that Napster
used the allure of free music to create such a large consumer base and demand in
the hopes of forcing record companies into negotiating a settlement.'28
A third philosophical strain underlying Napster and its progeny is even more
ominous sounding to record companies. Napster represents an anarchist bent, the
idea that music should be free. As the Nullsoft homepage, another Napster-like
service, boasts, "We're legitimate, nihilistic media terrorists, as history no doubt
will canonize us.,,129 To a certain extent, the current Napster movement parallels
the rise of the so-called counter-culture of the late 1960s, of which the Haight-
Ashbury district of San Francisco was a prime example.' 30 During this time,
bands like the Grateful Dead, Jefferson Airplane, and the Byrds made a ritual out
of free concerts in Golden Gate Park.' 3' The Grateful Dead continued this
tradition throughout their long touring career, allowing fans to tape their concerts
for free and trade them amongst fellow Dead-heads. The most recent example of
this phenomenon is the musical group Phish, which enjoyed (until their recent
disbandment) a following of very devoted fans that circulate tapes of live shows
and often travel throughout the country with the band, attending multiple concerts
in different cities.' 32 Although put somewhat glibly, many in this camp believe
' Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (Other documents state that "ultimately, Napster
could evolve into a full-fledged music distribution platform, usurping the record industry as we
know it today and allowing us to digitally promote and distribute emerging artists at a fraction
of the cost") (internal quotation marks omitted, quoting the deposition of Sean Parker, Napster's
co-founder).
"" Says Steven Fabrizio, a lawyer for the Recording Industry Association of America: "I
think that's clearly what Napster intends.... I think this is a very conscious business decision to
take first and ask later." John Gibeaut, Facing the Music, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 2000, at 37, 41,
104 (internal quotation marks omitted). This suspicion is confirmed by internal Napster
documents which note "we should focus on our realistic short-term goals while wooing the
industry before we try to undermine it." Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (internal quotation
marks omitted, quoting the deposition of Sean Parker, Napster's co-founder).
"' Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 37.
"0°To a large extent, the Haight-Ashbury scene, as it was known, was very much a
conscious attempt by its members to transcend what they saw as the traditional, and stifling,
materialistic paradigm imposed by Western society. Although arguably naive when viewed
through the lens of history, those involved in this social movement embraced an alternative
moral philosophy that conceptualized individuals interacting in a more communal manner and
rejected many traditional forms of property ownership. See generally TOM WOLFE, THE
ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1999) (documenting and discussing the rise and fall of the
Haight-Ashbury scene through the exploits of writer Ken Kesey and the Merry Pranksters).
1 Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 41.132 See Jenny Eliscu, Gone Phishing, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 23, 2000, at 35, 42 (discussing
how, in its seventeen years together, Phish "has established itself as an apt heir to the Grateful
Dead's legacy" and noting how many "Phish-heads" "travel around the country attending
shows").
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that music itself should be a communal, not necessarily commercial, experience:
"'The Man' is terrified of [Napster], more terrified than he ever was of the Sex
Pistols or the Woodstock Nation. Suddenly revolution is back in fashion. Napster
makes cyber hippies of us all."' 33
Most of these people are skeptical of the record industry's lamentations that
Napster will spell the end of music. The concept is that good music will never go
away. True artists will always be driven to create music, and people will continue
to seek out music they enjoy and remunerate artists they respect. What will end is
the current paradigm of exploiting consumers, a contention which is at least
supportable in light of a recent Federal Trade Commission ruling ordering the five
major record labels to cease a policy of price-fixing, in place since the early
1990s.1 34 "[The record companies] just need to get over themselves. They were
charging us too much for CDs in the first place, and I think artists and record
companies need to figure out another way to market their music to us. Most
music, especially if you're getting it off the computer, should be free.' 35 This
sentiment simply rejects the notion that what occurs on Napster is stealing.
B. Barriers to Enforcement
In many respects, Napster has been an easy legal target: it is an organized
corporate entity that has assets and a centralized nerve center to go after. While
Napster's unique business plan may prove to be- its undoing,'36 there exist
alternative file-sharing services on the Internet that threaten content industries in a
way Napster does not. Right now, many Napster clones exist that do not need a
central clearinghouse the way Napster does--"in other words, programs that do
what Napster does without a central authority to be held legally accountable."'
37
133 Stuart Maconie, MP3for the Devil, TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 2001, § 2, at 8. Maconie
further states:
[The record industry], you see, think Napster is the devil's spawn-as well they
would. Free music is anathema to record companies; ideally they'd like you to pay several
times over for the same music, i.e., a new copy of [the rock-group Pink Floyd's] Dark Side
of the Moon every time they invent a new format. A global family of music enthusiasts
happily sharing music is the kind of utopian hippy fantasy that gnaws at their innards.
Id. at 9.
1"4 Andrew Dansby, Government CD-Price War, ROLLING STONE, June 22, 2000, at 29.
The FTC decision, announced on May 10, 2000, estimated that music fans had been
overcharged nearly 500 million dollars in the preceding three years alone. Id. Furthermore, the
average CD price increased from $13.98 in 1995 to $16.98 in 2000. Id.Lyle V. Hams, Napster Fees May Bring Backlash Users Say, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Jan. 31, 2001, at C2.
'
3 6 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
'
37 Napster, Software Company Being Sued by Several Artists and Record Companies for
Copyright Infringement (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 23, 2000). Furthermore, Napster keeps lists
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Just hours after the initial injunction against Napster was granted in July 2000,
these services saw a sharp increase in use.
31
Two such PTP services are Gnutella and Freenet. Gnutella 139 allows for the
transfer of much more than MP3 music files-books, videos, software, essentially
any type of downloadable file-in a manner that contains no central server, so it
cannot be shut down.' 40 Furthermore, several technical advancements have made
Gnuetella more user-friendly.14 ' Freenet is perhaps even more radical. The
program not only is decentralized, but also encrypts files and passes them
anonymously from user to user, making file transfers untraceable. 142 Freenet also
has a much more political bent than Napster. While Napster is primarily
concerned with monetizing its popularity, Freenet creator Ian Clarke's dream is to
liberate, and perhaps destroy, intellectual property. 43 The system proclaims,
"Freenet is near-perfect anarchy."'
' 44
A third service becoming increasingly popular is Fast Track, used by services
such as Kazaa, Grokster, and MusicCity's Morhpeus. The Fast Track software
allows users to search hard drives online for not only music but also movies and
software. 4 5 What might be even more discouraging to record companies is that
Fast Track appears to be rivaling the popularity of Napster at its peak. Nearly 34
million copies of the software has been downloaded as of October 2001, and 1.5
billion songs were downloaded by users of the three services in September
of transfers, which provides potential litigants with a list of infringers. Levy, supra note 8, at
52-53.
138 Jenny Eliscu, Napster Court Battle Heats Up, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 9,2000, at 34.39 The Gnutella program was written by Justin Frankel-a programmer at Nullsoft, which
is owned by America Online. Within hours of posting Gnutella to the Nullsoft site, AOL
executives had it withdrawn, but the damage had been done. In that amount of time, the code
had circulated through the Internet, and now hundreds of programmers support an active
Gnutella community. Levy, supra note 8, at 53.
40 David Thigpen, Digital Swap Meets, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 14, 2000, at 50.
41 Until recently, Gnutella users had to possess much more knowledge than the average
web-surfer, such as the ability to search computers by IP address. However, Gnutella is an
"open-source" application, which means people are free to modify the basic technology. Two
new applications, Limewire and Bearshare, have been developed that replicate Napster's easy
search method. Within the first two months of its availability, over 200,000 users had
downloaded Bearshare, and an average of 5,000 to 10,000 people were online at any one time.
In a similar four-month period, approximately 100,000 users had downloaded Limewire.
Graham, supra note 116.
142 Thigpen, supra note 140, at 50.
141 "My opinion is that people who rely on copyright probably need to change their
business model." Levy, supra note 8, at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144 Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Jefferson Graham, Napster Proteges Under Fire From Entertainment Industry, USA
TODAY, Oct. 4, 2001, at D3.
[Vol. 63:799
NAPSTER OPENS PANDORAS BOX
2001.146 While the Recording Industry Association of America and the Motion
Picture Association of America have stated they have filed joint copyright
infringement suits against the companies, many challenges exist. First,
MusicCity, based in Nashville, is the only defendant based in the United States;
Fast Track and Kazaa are based in Amsterdam and Grokster in the West Indies.
147
Second, this latest round of lawsuits is unlikely to stop others from developing
new and similar file sharing programs. 148 Third, unlike Napster (but like Freenet
and Gnutella), no central directory exists; users with powerful computers and
high-speed Intemet connections serve as distributors or "supernodes."'
' 49
Another possibility for enforcement is to go after the infringing users
themselves. Although there exists at least one instance of this occurring, 5 ° record
companies have been very hesitant to pursue this course of action, a point which
was raised by Judge Beezer in oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit. 5' Record
companies, though, face several possible risks if they choose to pursue this
avenue of enforcement. First, going after relatively innocent users has the
potential threat of creating a tremendous backlash against the music industry,
reinforcing the "Robin Hood" mentality which has already been attached to the
digital transfer of music.'52 Second, it is uncertain if this sort of activity would
146 Id. Says Ric Dube, Webnoize analyst: "This is where Napster was a year ago. What's
more impressive is how fast they are growing. We saw a 55%jump in downloads from August
to September." 1d.
4 Id. "The more international [the legal situation] gets, the more beholden [copyright
holders] are to international laws, which makes it more challenging," says Jupiter Media Metrix
analyst Mark Mooradian. Id.
148 Graham, supra note 145, at D3. "There are always going to be young programmers
looking to create something," says Dube. "Working up a music program is always going to be
cool. This might scare off someone from thinking they could build a business on this, but not in
the new peer-to-peer programs that get passed around." Id.
1"9 Jefferson Graham, As Napster Shuts, Others Carry the Tune, USA TODAY, July 12,
2001, at D3.
"So Nineteen-year-old Scott Wickberg, a freshman at the Oklahoma State University, had
his computer seized by campus police on September 5, 2000. Jenny Eliscu, Freshman Busted
for MP3 Piracy, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 9, 2000, at 33, 33-34. Campus police were tipped-off
by the Recording Industry Association of America's (RIAA) Anti-Piracy Division, which
patrols the Internet in search of individuals believed to be illegally trading copyrighted music.
Id. Wickberg had been operating a file-sharing site, (FTP), from his dorm room computer. A
password allowed others to log on and download anything from his catalogue of 10,200 MP3s
(the size of which is most likely the reason why Wickberg was singled out). Id. Wickberg could
be charged with contributory copyright infringement, a felony that carries a penalty of up to five
years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Id.
... Morning Edition: Three-Judge Panel Hears Arguments from Both Sides in the Napster
Case (,NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 3, 2000).
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
2002]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
have any sort of deterrent effect upon the activity of MP3 traders. 153 This is a
crucial point, and one that will likely be tested by the music industry in the near
future.154 The problem, however, is that if the majority of current MP3 traders are
not deterred from engaging in this practice, either by the threat of civil liability or
criminal sanctions, the music industry faces a huge dilemma. While theoretically
possible, it is not economically feasible to sue fifty million'55 individuals for
copyright infringement. 1
56
C. Potential Market Solutions
Most likely, the presence of the Internet will not spell the end of the record
companies or commercial digital downloading. Says one record executive, "We'll
be fine. There will always be new music, and it's our job to figure out what
people want to hear."' 57 Also, questionable services such as Napster have
problems that can be solved by official sites with quality control measures: files
mis-labeled, "cuckoo eggs" (files that, once downloaded, do not contain the as
advertised song but "gotcha" messages from anti-Napster activists), and computer
viruses. 58 In addition, efforts are on the way to develop new technological
standards that will help make digital music more secure. 5 9
13 See generally supra note 92. Jason Thompson, a friend of Scott Wickberg, who was
present when campus police arrived at Wickberg's dorm room door, says: "Scott and I told
people what happened... and we told them to shut everything down, and they were like, 'Eh,
whatever. Go away.' Around here, it's not really affecting how much trading of MP3s
happens." Eliscu, supra note 150, at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154 See infra Part IV.D.
155 Harding, supra note 16, at 32 (estimating the number of registered Napster users at
fifty-seven million in February 2001).
156 Even assuming that every user's infringing activity results in $1,000 worth of lost
revenues to record companies (which represents a significant amount of downloading activity),
this is clearly an instance where the cost of enforcing copyrights would outweigh any amount
record companies could hope to recover.
1' Cohen, supra note 3, at 71 (comment of Val Azzoli, Atlantic Records Group co-
chairman) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Id. In addition, a further hurdle for Freenet is that because files are encrypted, it is
impossible to know beforehand what the file actually contains. Thigpen, supra note 140, at 50.
159 Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 n.31 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the formation of
the Secure Digital Music Initiative, a consortium of record labels, consumer-electronic
companies, and information-technology firms, and the various security measures it has
undertaken). However, these efforts may have a limited impact. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 71
(noting the limited efficacy of security measures such as encryption and watermarks); Gibeaut,
supra note 128, at 38 (quoting Charles Nesson, director of Harvard Law School's Berkman
Center for Internet & Society, that "[t]he technological barriers are dropping almost to zero")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Ultimately, however, the best defense may be a good offense. "The surest
protection against privacy is to make sure there's a high volume of quality, low-
priced items on the market.' '160 In this vein, one record company is gambling that
the best solution to the current dilemma is to co-opt the competition. On October
31, 2000, the German media giant Bertelsmann, owner of BMG Music, the
second largest record company in the United States in terms of market share,
161
stunned many when it announced it had dropped its lawsuit against Napster and
formed a strategic alliance with the fledgling company. 62 The deal itself involves
a forty million dollar loan from Bertelsmann in exchange for the right to acquire a
majority interest in Napster.165
One of the biggest unresolved questions, and the reason why the proposed
subscription service is so risky, is that nobody knows to what extent users weaned
on the old Napster will be willing to pay. A number of empirical analyses have
been performed, with widely varying outcomes.' 64 In many ways, Napster is
facing a unique problem with very few successful models to study. Several
popular sites, such as Slate and TheStreet.com, tried to build subscription-based
models and then quickly reverted to free services. 65 However, if Napster is able
to survive initial losses in users, a significant up-side potential exists. 66 Assuming
'60 Cohen, supra note 3, at 71. "There are lots of different tools available to labels to make
a legitimate digital download more appealing to a consumer than a questionable digital
download... [with items such as] lyrics, album art, connections to fan sites, [and] live tracks."
Goodman, supra note 91, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"' BMG collared 19.4% of the market in 2000. Other record labels making up the "Big
Five" include: Universal (28%), EMD (8.7%), Wamer/Elektra-Atlantic (13.5%), and Sony
(15.4%). All told, these companies hold 85% of the United States market. See Goodman, supra
note 121, at 21.
162 Jefferson Graham, Napster's Bertelsmann Alliance Isn't Music to All Ears, USA
TODAY, Nov. 2, 2000, at IA.
163 Mark Solomons, High Fidelity, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2001, (Creative
Business), at 10-11.
164 A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey found that 75% of music downloaders would stop if
they had to pay. Graham, supra note 17, at IA. Another market research study cited by
Bertelsmann of current Napster users shows that 70% are prepared to pay a membership fee.
Harding, supra note 16, at 32. This Webnoize study, however, was contingent upon users
having access to the current Napster, where virtually any song is available. "I'd be surprised if
[ten] percent stayed aboard," says Webnoize analyst Ric Dube. Get Ready to Pay for 'Free'
Songs, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 2001, at E9.165D.C. Denison, Pondering How Napster Can Make it to Pay Day, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
4, 2001, at HI.
166 Patricia Seybold, CEO of the Patricia Seybold Group in Boston and author of
Customers.com, says: "I think Napster's eventual subscribers will be a fraction of the current
number." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, she cites The Wall Street Journal's
online edition as a potential model: "When [The Wall Street Journal] instituted a paid
subscription model, their subscription numbers plummeted to 100,000 or so .... Eventually
they rose to about 250,000, where they have stayed. It's a much smaller number, but it's
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that Napster is able to attract 20% of its peak level users and charges five dollars a
month, this adds up to annual revenues of approximately 700 million dollars. 167 In
addition, other potential revenue streams exist.
16 8
Of course, Napster is not the only company getting into the online pay-for-
music game. In early 2002, the major record companies finally unveiled their own
music services. 16 9 Pressplay is a joint venture between Sony and Vivendi
Universal, and RealOneMusic is owned by Real Networks, AOL Time Warner,
EMI, and Bertelsmann AG. 70 Both services offer subscriptions that start around
ten dollars a month. 171 Both services have glaring weaknesses, however, which
include the fact that downloads expire if subscriptions lapse and limits, or outright
bans, on burning songs to CDs.'72
What is certain, however, is that any fee-for-music service faces a number of
hurdles in order to effect a smooth transition from free to pay service. One such
challenge is the daunting logistical feat of tracking billions of downloads by
millions of users. 173 Another factor to deal with is improving the quality of
service. 174 The third, and perhaps most important, issue is providing users with
definitely a business." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 Solomons, supra note 163, at 10.168 'There's no reason why Napster can't get three revenue streams going .... They can
push subscriptions, advertising, and sales--of CDs, concert tickets, merchandise." Denison,
supra note 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another possibility is for Napster to offer
users a thirty-day free trial, similar to AOL, on the condition that users submit personal
information, which could be used for direct marketing. Solomons, supra note 163, at 10.169Fred Goodman, Will Fans Pay for Music Online? ROLLING STONE, Jan. 31, 2002, at
17.
170 Don Clark & Lee Gomes, Napster Settles Suits; Judge Says System Must Remain Shut,
WALL ST. J., July 13, 2001, at B6.
171 Goodman, supra note 169, at 17.
171Id. at 17.
173 To a certain extent, Napster and Bertelsmann's subscription service is not a new idea.
In 1998, Gene Hoffman started an Internet music service, EMusic.com. Unlike Napster,
Hoffman first secured licensing deals with record companies and recording artists and charged
users a $9.99 monthly fee. EMusic's initial public offering debuted at $35 a share, settling in the
mid-$20s, until Napster destroyed its business model by offering music for free. Now the stock
price is around $0.50. Having already tackled the same business realities that Napster is soon to
face, Hoffman wams:
It's not like they will just attach a meter to their service and start pulling in the
money.... Once they start charging, it will change everything .... [For example,] they
are going to have to pay the record companies and the songwriters. That's two payments
per song. And they will have to build a centralized system to deal with billing and
customer service. They are also going to have to settle on a security standard so the files
can't be passed around. It's going to be a lot more work than they realize.
Denison, supra note 165 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Seth Godin, former vice president of direct marketing for Yahoo! and author of the
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access to the same variety of music to which they have been accustomed with free
services. 175 Part of the appeal of the old Napster service was that almost anything
was available on it. 176 Since Napster made the decision to move to a legitimate
subscription service, it has been trying to convince record labels to drop their
lawsuits and enter into licensing agreements. 177 This would allow Napster to have
a critical mass of songs, making the service much more attractive. However, with
the proliferation of new online services by record labels, this result seems
unlikely, at least in the near future.178 Most likely, any pay service that offers only
a limited selection of music will have a much diminished appeal to users.179 This
lack of cooperation among record companies could be an egregious tactical error,
as there simply may not be enough content on one label to justify the continued
payment of monthly fees. 180 Further, the resentment caused by Napster may
prevent the record labels from working together for some time. 8'
book Unleashing the Idea Virus, says: "Napster is going to have to be [ten] times better,
because they've already taught 50 million users that music can be free .... They have to prove
they are worth paying for." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Such features would
probably include enhanced security for file-sharing and improved sound quality. However,
Scott Bumett, IBM's development executive for the global media and entertainment industries,
says that even Napster's current model, whereby users supply content, could be made
"legitimate and secure." Solomons, supra note 163, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175 "Music fans really want the opportunity to choose from the entire body of recorded
music," says analyst Eric Scheirer of Forrester Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts. "If we
want to raise the price we're going to have to raise the opportunity." German Media Firm Says
Napster Will Charge Fees, supra note 20.
116 See Maconie, supra note 133:
Of course, if all that [Napster users] were doing was letting each other share the
David Gray album and new Christina Aguilera single, Napster would be as dull as most
radio stations and television pop shows. The point is that Napster is for mad people,
impulsives, obsessives, people who know and care way too much about music. They really
are sharing the theme from Robinson Crusoe, and Danger Mouse, and hardcore Belgian
techno and old Sinatra rarities and horse-frightening modem jazz. There are some 265,000
pieces of music of every hue and genre.
77 Harding, supra note 16, at 32; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
178 Goodman, supra note 169, at 18. Besides Pressplay and RealOneMusic, two additional
services, Full Audio and Rhapsody, are in the works.179 Phil Leigh, an analyst with investment banking firm Raymond James, stated that if a
fee-based Napster service were able to offer music from the five major labels, "it's a 10, a huge
deal," but that a service providing access to only two labels' catalogues would only be "a 3."
Graham, supra note 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"'0 Without the vast catalogue that is currently available on Napster, much of the value of a
subscription-based music service, the element of choice and consumer control, is lost. A
comparison of music to cable television, an industry with a successful subscription history, is
enlightening. Cable television works because, by paying a flat rate, users pretty much get access
to everything, from the major networks to ESPN to the History Channel. Different channels are
worth more collectively than they are individually. People are willing to pay for the
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Another factor cutting against Napster and other Internet music subscription
services is the ready availability of Napster substitutes and enforcement
problems.182 As discussed in the preceding paragraph, this is especially
problematic if these services fail to deliver the kind of selection that Napster
formerly offered. Ironically, Napster may have done too good a job at pushing the
demand for free music. Many Napster users considered themselves part of a large,
communal music experience.. 3 and have expressed sentiments that Napster
betrayed them by "selling out.'
' 84
In many ways, Napster was about not only sharing music but also
communicating, whether intended or not, an implicit belief about the proper reach
of copyrights. For almost two years, people became accustomed to sharing and
downloading free music on Napster, and, at the same time, they began to re-
conceptualize how and in what circumstances they should be charged for access
to music.185 The record industry reported that it lost 4.5 billion dollars to pirates in
1999, mainly through counterfeit hard copies of CDs.'86 The ideology that
Napster helped create turns this claim on its head: record companies are not losing
money from PTP file-sharing because they never had the right to control or
convenience of multiple options, even though they may not watch a majority of programs on
any one channel. Asking users to subscribe to each separate record label's service is like asking
them to subscribe separately to every television channel they watch.
Music is also dissimilar from television in two key respects which bode unfavorably for a
subscription model. First, television produces a superior amount of new content. Compared to
an average television program, which airs approximately twenty-five new episodes a season,
even the most prolific of recording acts would be hard pressed to record more than ten hours of
music in an entire career. As such, most of the value of a music subscription service lies in the
record companies' archives, the back catalogue of recordings that would be available. See
Cohen, supra note 3, at 69. Second, music as an artistic paradigm is much more dependent on
repeat listening than television is on repeat viewing. See Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 41. While
people usually only watch most programs once or twice, music fans listen to their favorite
songs and albums over and over.
8 This tension is evidenced by the different approaches record labels have taken towards
dealing with Napster, particularly Bertelsmann. Bertelsmann's announcement of its deal with
Napster and its subscription service met with a tepid response at the World Economic Forum in
Davos, Switzerland, including the chairs of Sony and Vivendi-Universal. Peter Capella,
Napster to Charge Online Song Swappers, THE GUARDAN (London), Jan. 30, 2001, at 26.
182 See supra Part IV.B.
183 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
194 "1 believe Napster's sole idea of the future was to be part of the money-hungry record
industry," says one Napster user. Graham, supra note 162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another Napster user shares, "[Napster is] a sellout .... Music prices are already too high, and
for them to charge for this too is wrong." Graham, supra note 116 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
: 
5 See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
186 Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 38.
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restrict this sharing of music in the first place.'87 A subscription-based Napster
may suffer from the very sentiments it helped popularize.
D. Looking to the Future
For the foreseeable future, the music industry will be in a state of flux as the
three forces discussed previously in Part IV-normative philosophies,
enforcement issues, and market factors-interact in an! attempt to find a state of
equilibrium. What exactly the outcome will be remains uncertain. A page of
history is worth a volume of logic. However, with approximately 14.6 billion
dollars in annual revenue at stake,18 8 one certainty is that record companies will
be vigorous in their efforts to maintain the commercial value of their copyrights.
Most likely, the music industry will first attempt to undercut the momentum
of free services like Freenet and Gnutella by competing with them in the
marketplace. 18 9 As discussed, though, market solutions will likely provide only a
partial fix.' 90 Free services will most certainly divert users from fee-based
subscription services, but the key question is to what extent. It remains to be seen
whether the more radical philosophies underlying Napster and its progeny' 9 will
continue to hold popularity. Napster is a social phenomenon, but it may be a
short-lived one.
If a significant number of Napster users do defect to free services, the next
logical action taken by record companies will be to sue individual users of these
services. 192 Most likely, this would involve strategically filing suits against high-
profile individuals (those who are the most egregious examples of copyright
infringers)' 93 in an attempt to maximize deterrence value while minimizing public
backlash. 194 If the situation becomes more precarious for the record companies,
one could witness lawsuits filed to enjoin programmers from distributing software
that is especially well-suited for facilitating copyright infringement on the
187 In the course of researching this note, the author conducted several informal interviews
with fellow law students who have used Napster in order to glean insight into their perceptions
on the service. Although most likely an attempt to rationalize their actions at least in part, a
surprising number of students felt no moral conflict downloading songs from Napster,
contending that they primarily used Napster to download songs they otherwise would not have
purchased. In other words, Napster merely allowed them personal use and enjoyment of songs
heretofore unavailable.
... Gibeaut, supra note 128, at 38.
1
'
9 See supra Part 1V.C.
90 See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (detailing the numerous obstacles that a
full-fledged subscription-based service will face).
191 See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
'9' See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 150.
194 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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Intemet.' 95 Through these legal and public relations battles, each side will
continue to challenge the other's philosophical and economic commitment to its
position until ultimately one backs down.
The preceding discussion details the process that will most likely ensue as the
music industry attempts to protect the commercial value of its copyrights. It also
demonstrates that, while uncertain, the ultimate resolution of this process will
largely depend upon one question: Is the popularity of Napster truly indicative of
a fundamental shift in how people conceptualize the proper role of copyright in
music and society at large, or is it merely the result of people trying to get
something for nothing? The answer has ramifications worth billions of dollars.
V. CONCLUSION
The social phenomenon known as Napster has already opened a Pandora's
Box, and the music industry's enforcement of copyright will never be the same
again. In the span of a few short years, a software program developed by a
nineteen-year-old college freshman has developed into the fastest-growing service
in history, accumulating over fifty million users by early 2001 .196 This same
software program has managed to galvanize numerous factions in the artistic,
business, and legal communities in a way that few other issues have in recent
memory. The legal fate of Napster as a free service, however, already appears
ordained, and in many ways it is surprising to note how blas6 Napster was about
its potential infringement liability.
The likely outcome of the Napster litigation, though, will not conclude the
matter. Underlying the rise of Napster, one discerns burgeoning progressive-or
radical, depending upon one's views-social theories. Napster involved, at least
in part, not only an entirely new method of distributing music but also a new
ideology. The popularity of Napster has allowed many to reexamine the degree to
which, and under what circumstances, copyright holders should be able to control
the dissemination of artistic content, or at least music, in society. Coupled with
the inherent difficulties in enforcement and the likely limited ability of the
marketplace to provide a solution, the music industry faces an uphill battle.
The exact degree to which the music industry will be transformed by the
social forces unleashed by Napster remains to be seen. The foreseeable future,
however, will most likely involve a series of legal, commercial, technical, and
ideological encounters as record companies seek to preserve the commercial
'9' In fact, this situation has already occurred, albeit in the movie industry context. On
August 17, 2000, U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan ordered Eric Corley to remove a
program called DeCSS, which allows users to decode and transfer DVDs over the Internet,
from the web site of his magazine. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d
294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
196 Harding, supra note 16, at 32.
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value of their copyrights. Ultimately, the long-term outcome will largely depend
upon the extent to which Napster's rise in popularity was truly indicative of a
normative re-conceptualization of the proper role of copyright in music and
society at large.

